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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the role of third-party interventions in the
failed peace process of Colombia that took place between 1998 and
2002. It analyses how both neutral and biased interventions impact-
ed upon conflict dynamics. The article demonstrates that the neutral
intervention was limited to the initiation of the peace talks and
intermittent particularly in its final phase, while the biased inter-
vention, led by the US, changed the incentive structure of the actors
involved, creating hopes among the hard liners that the US could
help them in winning the war. In hindsight, this biased intervention
failed to tip the balance of power, but contributed to the derailment
of the peace process.  This article argues that third party interven-
tion, particularly the biased intervention, failed to dismantle the
war system.  Instead, it has brought the Colombian war system into
a phase of fluctuating stalemate, characterized by renewed volatili-
ty and violence.
INTRODUCTION
Why some civil wars are difficult to terminate has become a major puzzle
for those seeking to understand and resolve violent conflict. The average duration
of civil wars increased in the post Cold-War period to 15.1 years from a median
duration of 5.5 years in 1999.1 Of the civil wars that started after 1945, one-quar-
ter lasted two years, another quarter lasted at least 15 years, and thirteen lasted 20
years or more.2 The problem of these protracted wars poses a series of theoreti-
cal and empirical challenges to students of civil wars that has, in turn, generated
a significant literature in the last decade. In spite this attention, research has not
yet provided satisfactory explanations for a range of key issues, such as why 
some conflicts are more protracted than others or, when they terminate, why they
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do so. In part, this failure may be a result of overzealous attempts to find an over-
arching theory that could explain the dynamics of all civil wars, or at least a pre-
ponderant number of them (large N), while also factoring in their nuances and
peculiarities.  Of course, this observation invokes the traditional debate of
whether we scholars should lower our theoretical ambitions – and rethink our
methodological approaches or rather focus our energies on refining large-N quan-
titative studies. In my view, given that scholarly research has already generated a
substantial body of empirical studies, it may be time to retool and rethink “mid-
dle-range theories” that are constantly enriched by the findings of both large-N
studies and individual cases, and to strengthen the linkages between quantitative
and qualitative research. 
Explanations of conflict termination can be divided into four broad cate-
gories.3 The first category argues that civil war termination is a function of the
military balance, political conditions, and economic costs of the conflict that are
likely to encourage the combatants to find a negotiated settlement.4 According to
this perspective, when both parties are hurting from the conflict in terms of rising
fatalities, the costs of the confrontation are increasing, and the region is not favor-
ing the continuation of the conflict, then a negotiated settlement becomes viable.
The second set of explanations argues that a negotiated settlement is possible
when combatants manage to resolve their core disputes. Accordingly, a negotiat-
ed settlement is possible only when a bargain is reached.5 This  reasoning is cir-
cular and does little to identify the necessary conditions for the crucial bargain
that must be met in the first instance. A third set of explanations maintains that a
successful and durable negotiated settlement depends on the guarantees provided
by a third party as well as its capacity to enforce the terms of an agreement.6 The
fourth category argues that the correlation of the military power balance and the
costs of the war in itself is insufficient to determine the “ripe moment” – to use
William Zartman’s famous phrase – for a successful conclusion of conflict, unless
the “real” costs are complemented by a perception among the combatants and
their support bases that they could be better off with a settlement than with con-
tinued war.7 This article seeks to assess the validity of some of the core proposi-
tions of each of these explanatory frameworks on the duration of civil wars by
examining why the 1998-2002 Colombian peace process failed.8
Here, it is useful to define the concept of the war system as used in this
article.  A war system is a pattern of violent interaction among different actors
sustained over a period of time. As such, war systems are embedded in every civil
war situation.  The emergence, consolidation, and duration of war systems
depend, in part, on the evolution of the correlation of forces among warring
actors, and on the political economies that each of the belligerent forces construct
during the course of the conflict. In this analysis, if the political, economic, and
military assets that any actor obtains during the conflict exceed what it had prior
the conflict, then this is considered as a positive political economy. Positive polit-
ical economies may generate incentives to continue the war until one of the par-
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ties prevails. War systems are not rational constructs nor does their perpetuation
depend on one actor’s behavior. War systems are as much the product of unin-
tended consequences of actors’ behavior or of actors’ attempts to outsmart their
opponents, as they are of structural constraints, such as the balance of military
power, the limited resources at the disposal of one party or another, or the inter-
national conditions that inhibit one party from pursuing a winning strategy.
Agency and structure are integral parts of the war system theory. Agency is
defined in terms of how the organization of the parties to the conflict, such as
rebel groups, the military, or segments of classes such as landowners, cattle
ranchers, or owners of banks, articulate their political interests. War systems then,
are dynamic. They influence their units (and act as an independent variables) and
their stability is dependent on the outcome of units’ behaviors and changes in
their regional and international environments.9
This article evaluates the role of two key third parties, the United Nations
and the United States, during the 1998-2002 peace process in Colombia.10 It
attempts to explain why these two parties failed in “maturing” the conditions for
peace and how their failure had the effect of prolonging the civil war, thereby also
contributing to the inertia of the war system. This article builds upon previous
research on the civil wars of Colombia, Lebanon, and Angola, which I have char-
acterized as war systems to explain their protracted nature.11
This analysis distinguishes between two types of intervention: biased
interventions, by which third parties, typically a single state with interests of its
own and having a stake in a particular outcome, provide military, diplomatic, and
economic support that favors one group, say the government, against its oppo-
nents; and neutral interventions, which are undertaken by a neutral party such as
an international organization, and are undertaken for the neutral end of a viable
peace agreement, even though such agreements may not benefit all parties equal-
ly in practice. While neutral intervention may have stimulated pragmatic imme-
diate political gains, the biased intervention changed the incentive structures of
the warring groups by giving one party hope of improving its military standing
against its opponent and hence reducing that party’s interest in negotiating. While
the other party fearing this biased intervention seeks to offset it by adopting new
strategies. A case in point is the FARC’s (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia) political behavior:  when the Plan Colombia was imminent it institu-
tionalized its ransom-kidnapping by declaring its 002 Law to secure more
income.  Although this article’s findings are consistent with the growing empiri-
cal evidence that suggests third-party interventions mostly fail to decisively end
violent conflicts, it also suggests that neither type of intervention were, in this
case, sufficient to explain the failure of the peace process.  Rather, I argue that the
interplay of these third-party interventions with the war system’s inertia provides
a better explanation as to why the Colombian peace process collapsed. 
This article draws upon Webster’s definition of “inertia” as a property by
which matter – or, for the purposes of this analysis, a war system – remains “at
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rest or in uniform motion in the same straight line unless acted upon by some
external force.”12 Inertia is the inherent resistance to change that allows the war
system to perpetuate over time. The external forces in this article are the third-
party interventions.  Further, it operationalizes the war system’s inertia by noting
patterns or changes in the number of violent attacks between guerrillas and the
armed forces. 
In part, the inertia of the war system stems from the social actors who con-
sider violence as the most cost-effective mechanism to achieve a favorable nego-
tiated outcome of their social conflict, given the higher costs of peace they would
likely incur if a settlement were to be reached under a military impasse. 
Third Parties: “Maturing” the Conditions, “Stimulating”
Pragmatism, and Changing Incentives
The role of third-party interventions has received considerable attention in
the conflict resolution literature.  Third parties have been depicted variously as
facilitators, biased actors, or as impartial guarantors of the implementation of
agreements.  But among scholars there is no agreement on whether third-party
interventions prolong or shorten the duration of civil wars.  Conventional wisdom
and some studies suggest that a third-party role has proven critical to progress at
certain points in certain peace processes, such as those of Lebanon, Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, El Salvador, and Guatemala.13 Whether acting as mediators, facil-
itators, and/or enforcers, third parties in these cases arguably helped in hammer-
ing out agreements by resolving sticking points, providing open channels of com-
munication and confidence-building measures, overseeing the implementation
process, and guaranteeing the personal security of the combatants.14 In sharp con-
trast, Patrick Regan’s study of 150 civil wars during the period 1945-99 found
that in 101 cases there were 1,036 individual interventions that had the effect of
prolonging conflict. Regan concludes that third-party intervention tends over-
whelmingly to prolong rather than shorten conflict, whether this intervention was
by a biased or neutral party.15 Alternatively, research undertaken by Dylan Balch-
Lindsay and Andrew Enterline concludes that third-party biased intervention on
the side of government tends to prolong conflicts, while a neutral third-party
intervention increases the probability that a war will end at any given point in
time.16 Given the contrasting findings of these large-N quantitative analyses, a
micro-level case study may be a useful way to inform the debate as to why third-
party interventions fail, and why and how they instead may contribute to conflict
duration. 
In the late 1990s, Colombia experienced both types of third-party interven-
tion, both at the onset of and during the peace process itself: one was initiated at
the outset by a neutral party, the UN; the other by a biased party, namely the
United States, beginning a few months after the initiation of the peace process in
January 1999. Each intervention will be discussed in turn. 
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For most of the 1990s, a negotiated settlement to the Colombian conflict
remained a remote possibility, particularly in view of the peace attempts of the
1980s which brought only mixed results and partial successes.  Afterwards, the
war system in Colombia entered a new phase in its consolidation. During the
administration of Ernesto Samper (1994-98), which was severely weakened by
the narcodollars that allegedly supported his presidential campaign, the govern-
ment lacked the needed legitimacy to mobilize political support for engaging the
guerrillas in peace talks.  What ensued was an interlude of eight years in which
the idea of a negotiated settlement was effectively shelved. One may have hoped
that the increased intensity of warfare between 1994 and 1998 – as measured by
the number of fatalities, the frequency and scope of massacres, the incidence of
armed clashes, the number of internally displaced people, and the economic costs
of war – all underscored by an obvious military impasse, would have convinced
the combatants and their support bases that a negotiated settlement was a desir-
able exit strategy.  That lack of interest in a negotiated settlement and the escala-
tion of warfare was also due to the FARC’s consolidation of power and prepara-
tion for a shift in its military strategy from a “mobile war” to a “war of positions”
under which it could hold fixed territories for an expanded period of time.17
Neutral Intervention
The idea of initiating the peace talks of 1998 did not come from the
Pastrana government nor the FARC. Rather, the idea to jump-start peace talks was
first articulated by a group of academics supported by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) in 1997. This group invited the then-presidential
candidates, including Andres Pastrana, to a meeting held in Quirama, Antioquia.
The group succeeded in persuading all candidates who attended to sign the
Quirama declaration, by which they committed, irrespective of who won the elec-
tions, to support the initiation of peace talks with the FARC and ELN. Only two
candidates declined this invitation and refused to make the commitment: Harold
Bedoya, the former commander of the military, and Pastrana. Pastrana explained
his demural on the grounds that he was not yet an officially-declared presidential
candidate and therefore not in a position to do so, while Bedoya was against any
negotiation with the insurgency.18
In January 1998, a new UNDP representative, Francesco Vincenti, was
appointed to Colombia. Vincenti brought a new and more aggressive direction to
the Quirama declaration by building a consultative network with an expanding
group of stakeholders.19 This network soon included seven individuals, including
UN officials stationed in Bogotá, journalists, and a politician. This self-designat-
ed group chose the UNDP offices as their meeting place. The UNDP officers
elaborated a peace proposal that was then submitted to a working group that
included Alvaro Leyva, a prominent figure of the Conservative Party and ex-min-
ister of Mines; James Lemoyne, who was at the time a UNDP consultant; Maria
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Elvira Bonilla, a journalist and wife of then-Senator Juan Manuel Ospina
(Conservative Party); Jorge Urbina, a lawyer from Costa Rica Juan Manuel
Santos, the director of Fundacion Buen Gobierno; and Alfredo Molano, a sociol-
ogist and leftist intellectual.20
The group initiated its work in February 1998, several months before the
election that brought Pastrana into the presidency. The “kitchen group,” as I refer
to it in this article, met with the three most important presidential aspirants:
Noemi Sanin, leader of the movement Si Colombia, Horacio Serpa, leader of the
Liberal Party, and Andres Pastrana, leading a faction of the Conservative Party,
the Nueva Fuerza Democratica.  Notably, Pastrana was the least interested among
the three in what the kitchen group proposed to him only three weeks before the
first presidential round.21
The first round of elections left Pastrana in second place against Serpa,
having gained 34.73 percent of the votes compared to Serpa’s 35.03 percent.  As
a result, Pastrana took a more serious look into the kitchen group’s proposal for
launching a new round of peace negotiations.22 Alvaro Leyva, a close friend to
Pastrana, was instrumental in changing Pastrana’s view of the proposal, arguing
that for Pastrana to win the presidency he would have to articulate a peace strat-
egy that would go further than what his closest rival, Serpa, had proposed. Leyva,
alongside Victor G. Ricardo, Rafael Pardo, and Augusto Ramirez, drafted a 20-
point proposal that became Pastrana’s official peace platform, launched during
his bid to win the run-off vote. The Leyva and company document drew heavily
from the previous two months’ work of the kitchen group, in which, along with
the presidential candidates, they had consulted with military commanders
(Fernando Tapias and Jorge Enrique Mora), Nicanor Restrepo, a member of the
influential business conglomerate, the Antioquian Sindicate, and also Julio Mario
Santo Domingo, the owner of the important business conglomerate, Santo
Domingo.
It was only at this point that first contacts were made with the leaders of
the FARC, numbering 18,000 combatants. Leyva, Vincenti, and Lemoyne went to
Mexico City to meet with FARC representative Raul Reyes, a member of its
General Secretariat, the highest-ranking level in the guerrilla organization, in
what would be the first of three meetings.23 After meeting with Reyes, this same
group then met with Peter Romero, Assistant Secretary of State of the Western
Hemisphere at the US State Department to inform him about the intended peace
process.24 That visit set in motion a process within the US administration that cul-
minated in December 1998, after Pastrana had won the election, in a now-famous
meeting between Phil Chicola, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Andean Affairs, and the FARC commander, Raul Reyes, in Costa Rica. That
meeting was the first between the FARC and senior US officials since the begin-
ning of the FARC’s armed struggle in the early 1960s. The FARC’s motives for
engaging Pastrana and the US were multiple, including achieving its long sought
goal of belligerent status and to break its political isolation. 
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For his part, Pastrana endorsed Leyva’s strategy of winning the election by
articulating a road map that included meeting the FARC’s key demand of with-
drawing state military forces from five contested municipalities.25 This platform
tipped the electoral balance in Pastrana’s favor. 
The Pastrana electoral machine played the peace card with great efficien-
cy.  A case in point was that a few days prior to the second presidential round
Pastrana’s emissary met with FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda. That meeting
was widely publicized by the media and the noted photo of Marulanda wearing a
wristwatch from the Pastrana campaign was possibly the icing on the cake of
Pastrana’s ensuing victory. 
Detailing this historical account is important because it provides telling
insight into how the peace process started, the decisive role played by neutral
third parties in its onset, and the conditions under which the combatants agreed
to negotiate.  This history also casts some light on the combatants’ degree of
“ripeness” for this process.  The most notable insight is that neither the FARC nor
sectors of the political elite and dominant classes were the driving force behind
starting the peace talks. What is noteworthy is that Pastrana and his campaign
team, in their zeal to win the elections, especially after losing the first round to
the Liberal presidential candidate, deployed their peace strategy first and fore-
most as a vote-getting strategy, not as a dedicated and principled effort to end the
conflict. Indeed, that critical role was performed by the UNDP’s Colombia’s
office alongside a select group of academics, journalists, and politicians. 
It is not surprising, then, that when the peace talks were initiated there was
no clear agenda. Nor did either of the combatant parties have a set of objectives
or a negotiating strategy beyond what they had already obtained: for the FARC,
the withdrawal of government troops from the five municipalities; for Pastrana,
electoral victory. Among observers of the early peace dialogues, it was well-
understood that neither the FARC nor the government were committed to peace
talks for their own sake, but were drawn into the process by a number of other
factors, including public relations, domestic public opinion, regional and interna-
tional pressure, and a desire to improve their political-military position vis-à-vis
one another. Perhaps the best description of the inauspicious beginning of the
peace process was that of a prominent journalist, Hernando Gomez Buendia, who
wrote: “that peace process was born dead because of a birth defect, in reality there
was no negotiation, but a series of squabbles on technical issues, and especially
over ‘la zona de distension’.”26 In my view the “birth defect” that doomed the
process from the outset was the exclusive focus on immediate gains. The kitchen
group intervention changed the incentive structure for both Pastrana and the
FARC, stimulating their respective appetites for immediate gains that were not
conducive to setting the grounds for a genuine and sustainable peace process.
This could explain why both parties quickly became stuck in the technical squab-
bles referred to by Gomez. One military stalemate preceeding the peace talks,
contrary to what George Modelski thought, is not the most important condition of
a settlement.27
While it is true that Pastrana initially saw the peace process merely as a
way to win the presidency, his administration nonetheless continued the process
after the election. There are several reasons for this. First, the withdrawal of gov-
ernment troops, as demanded by the FARC, from an area double the size of El
Salvador had created a momentum of its own, not least by raising political expec-
tations among important segments of Colombian society, including its dominant
classes. Already in 1997, there was an upsurge in popular demands for peace,
expressed in the symbolic 10 million votes for peace in the Peace Mandate
(Mandato por la Paz) that grew thereafter. In addition, within the government
team there was also a group, including the Antioquian Conservative leader Fabio
Valencia Cossio and Victor G. Ricardo, who became the government chief nego-
tiator, who had tied their political fortunes to the success of a peace initiative that
had already brought them into the spotlight.  Valencia Cossio gambled on the
peace card in the hopes that it would not only bring Pastrana the presidency but
also would enhance his own prospects for securing that office in 2002.28
This pro-peace group was supported by influential elites, such as Nicanor
Restrepo, who occupied a prominent position within the Sindicato Antioqueno, an
important conglomerate of business enterprises based in the department of
Antioquia. In a certain sense the peace card that Pastrana used to win the presi-
dency created a “peace constituency,” motivated by pragmatic political interests
that were difficult to ignore after he was elected.  Given this constellation of inter-
ests, it became imperative for the government to explore further avenues for the
process it had set in motion, despite its own ill-preparedness.
The lack of a negotiating strategy on part of the Pastrana team was best
described by Ricardo Correa, the Secretary General of the ANDI (The National
Association of Industrialists), who participated in the last phase of the peace
process as a member of the government negotiating team. Correa revealed that the
government team had little idea of what items it wished to negotiate, whereas the
FARC’s representatives presented specific positions on the agrarian question and
political reforms. “The government negotiators did not know how to respond nor
did they have a mandate to do so.”29 According to Correa, changes in the compo-
sition of the government’s negotiating team , together with the lack of coordina-
tion between the team and the government, only exacerbated the problem further.
As Correa reported, at times, “the government’s negotiators felt that they were not
supported by the central government.”30 These revelations show just how little the
“peace” option had been thought through by the Pastrana team.
Clearly, while the UN-led neutral intervention served to jump-start the
peace talks, it did so only because it served the expedient political interests of the
combatant parties, interests that were largely unrelated to reaching a sustainable
settlement. Pastrana won the presidency, while the FARC gained territory, politi-
cal prestige, and international recognition.  However influential they were to the
onset of the peace talks, the neutral intervention of the UN-led kitchen group soon
ended as neither the government nor the FARC were interested in a third-party
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mediator that could participate in the process.31 This may have been the main
shortcoming of this neutral intervention. 
As stated at the outset, the failure of the peace process was a product not
only of the limited and partial nature of this intervention, but also of the way
third-party involvement interacted with the war system.  Neutral intervention by
the UNDP-led peace group had only a slight impact on the inertia of the war sys-
tem, since the configuration of the conflict conformed to a pattern that had start-
ed in 1990. Figure 1 demonstrates the increasing intensity of the conflict follow-
ing the 1990 Casa Verde attack against the FARC headquarters, then declining for
a period, and then rising again in 1997, in the wake of the emergence of a new
military actor – the unified paramilitary structure under the Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia (AUC).  As the figure also shows, the intensity of conflict declined
somewhat in 1998, returning to the 1995 level. This suggests that the third-party
neutral intervention may have acted upon the war system inertia by decelerating,
at least for a few months, the escalating trend that had started in 1995.  Finally, it
is noteworthy that the acceptance of the parties to engage in the peace talks was
not really due to the military stalemate nor the balance of power and the rising
costs of the war, but rather corresponded to a different motivation as explained
above. This is contrary to the assumptions of expected utility choice theorists
such as Zartman, Donald Wittman and David Mason, Joseph Weingarten and
Patrick Fett.32
Figure 1. Intensity of the Conflict at the National and Regional Level
Source: Vicepresidencia de la Republica, Informes, 2004.
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Beginning in 1999, however, the US-led biased intervention helped propel
the conflict to an unprecedented degree of intensity. The impact of this biased
intervention is discussed below. 
Biased Intervention and Its Impact on Local Actors 
Notwithstanding the less than favorable conditions under which the peace
negotiations originated, these initial conditions alone do not explain its ultimate
failure.  That the process was so quickly taken over by the biased intervention of
the United States government makes it impossible to fully assess the full impact
of the neutral intervention, or to infer with confidence whether the process would
have been more fruitful had it been left to continue.  Given these limitations, the
analysis in the following sections instead details how and why the biased inter-
vention contributed to the collapse of the process.  The impact of the United
States’ involvement was to strengthen the bargaining position of the government’s
armed forces, the agribusiness elite, and their right-wing paramilitary allies,
thereby reducing any incentive for them to negotiate under the 1996-98 balance
of forces, which they perceived to be more favorable to the FARC.
In fact, fears among the military and its allies of an unfavorable settlement
were not unfounded. Between 1996 and 1998, the FARC scored several impor-
tant military victories (Las Delicias and Purerres [1996], San Juanito and
Patascoy [1997], Miraflores, El Billar, and Mutata [1998]), suggesting that the
FARC had acquired the military initiative and tactical advantage against govern-
ment forces.33 These battles continued throughout 1999, increasing the level of
insecurity among the military and the right-wing elements in the political estab-
lishment and also worrying US decision-makers.34
In executing these attacks, the FARC deployed forces ranging from 300 to
2,000 combatants, indicating that the FARC’s military strategy was becoming
more sophisticated, shifting from small guerrilla units using hit and run tactics to
“mobile warfare,” employing a larger number of combatants (battalion-strength)
and targeting well-armed garrisons in peripheral cities.35 The insecurity of the
Colombian military resonated among important circles within the Clinton admin-
istration who were increasingly concerned about the growing military capacities
of the FARC.36 Consequently, in December 1998, at the same time that Philip
Chicola, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Andean Affairs, was meeting
with the FARC in Costa Rica, the US and Colombian governments agreed to form
a new counter-narcotics battalion to be stationed in Putumayo, close to the strong-
holds of the FARC.37 Strong opposition within the Republican-controlled US
Congress to Chicola’s meeting with the FARC quickly aborted the tentative US-
FARC rapprochement.38
Against the backdrop of the FARC’s military successes, another develop-
ment alarmed both decision makers in the Clinton administration and conserva-
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tives in the US Congress.  In January 1999, the CIA released a report in which it
claimed that a new and large-scale effort of coca seeding was occurring in the
FARC-controlled department of the Putumayo, which stood to increase coca pro-
duction considerably. According to the report, these new coca fields were estimat-
ed to yield the FARC additional revenues of between USD$100 million to
USD$500 million by the year 2000.39 These revenues would have allowed the
FARC to consolidate its tactical gains, thereby establishing a strategic advantage
against the military, which in turn may have ended the comfortable military
impasse upon which the war system in Colombia has rested for the better part of
its 40-year long conflict, as well as usher in a political triumph for the FARC.
However, such a possibility was one that Washington was not willing to accept
given its post-Cold War hegemonic position in the world system and the threat to
its regional interests a FARC victory could entail. The US viewed the FARC as a
destabilizing force that could help to undermine its strategic interests in the
Andean region.40
Within the Clinton administration, by then beleaguered by the Lewinski
affair and facing impeachment proceedings in the US Senate, the CIA report and
the poor performance of the Colombian armed forces gave rise to a re-evaluation
of the US position on Colombia. This new position was based upon a hardening
perception that Pastrana was caving in to the FARC, acting more like a mediator
between the FARC and the armed forces than as head of state.41 The tipping point
came in February 1999, when a unit of the FARC first kidnapped and later assas-
sinated three US activists working for an American NGO. This act provided
enough ammunition for the Republican Congress to abort Clinton’s support for
peace negotiations, again putting US policy on a collision course, both with the
Colombian insurgents and with Pastrana’s peace initiative. 
In August 1999, Thomas Pickering, the Undersecretary for Political
Affairs, and Barry Mcaffarey, Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, visited Bogotá and communicated to Pastrana that if he continued his con-
cessions to the FARC he would risk losing US support.  At the same time, they
also offered Pastrana a carrot: a substantial increase in the US military aid to
Colombia provided that Pastrana adopted a comprehensive plan to revamp the
military and reinvigorate the anti-drug war.42 The contours of this plan were sub-
sequently formulated by the State Department in consultation with their
Colombian counterparts and other US agencies, and baptized “Plan Colombia.” 
Plan Colombia, approved by the US Congress in July 2000, represented a
qualitative leap in the magnitude and scope of US involvement in Colombia’s war
system. For one, the US committed USD$1.3 billion (of which more than $860
million were assigned to Colombia and 80 percent of which were earmarked for
military purposes) over a three-year period to upgrade its war against drugs in the
Colombian theater, particularly in the southern parts of the country (Putumayo,
Caqueta, Guaviare).  To put this in perspective, in 1995, Colombia received only
USD$30 million in US support. By 1998, that amount had increased threefold to
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USD$98 million and, by 1999 to USD$294 million. In total, between 1999 to
2002, the US gave Colombia USD$2.04 billion in aid, 81 percent of which was
for military purposes.43 The US provision of these considerable resources brought
Colombia into the orbit of American strategic importance on a level just below
Israel and Egypt, traditionally the two largest recipients of US military assistance.
This was a qualitative leap in the US decision-makers’ approach to Colombia, and
one which served to integrate Colombia more tightly than ever before into the
international political economy of the US war on drugs, with all of its political,
military, security, and economic implications. 
A.  Plan Colombia and Incentive Structure: the Military
Clearly, the military institution is a formidable player in the political econ-
omy of war and peace. In Colombia, the military institution has long occupied a
position of paramount influence in the management of public order and security.
This dominance stemmed from a 1957 accord under which the military agreed to
relinquish direct political power in return for autonomy in administering public
order, national security, the military budget, and a free hand in administering its
military courts to prosecute both its own members as well as those civilians
accused of undermining public order. Taken together, these measures assured the
military a strong position of power vis-à-vis civilian authorities.  Whenever the
civilian leadership sought to undertake a negotiated solution to the conflict, the
military had the power to protect its competing agenda. The evidence in support
of the spoiler role of the Colombian military is abundant. In 1985, at a time when
the Betancur government was pushing for a negotiated peace, the M19
(Movimiento 19 de Abril) attacked the Supreme Court of Justice in the center of
Bogota, only a few metres away from the presidential palace. The military seized
upon this event to gain broader policy powers in the areas of defense and securi-
ty, and demand an end to peace talks.  It was a virtual political coup.44 While
Betancur finished his term, his peace initiative died in the ruins of the Justice
Palace. Another illustration of the divergent approaches of the military and civil-
ian authorities toward the conflict was the 1990 attack by government forces on
Case Verde in La Uribe, the headquarters of the FARC since 1984. This attack
was launched amidst peace negotiations and on the same day as elections to the
Constitutional Assembly – elections that were to provide an authoritative mandate
for drafting a new constitution. This attack effectively derailed negotiations with
the FARC, despite two subsequent attempts to save it in Caracas, Venezuela, and
Tlaxcala, Mexico.45
The military did not undergo any change of heart under the government of
Pastrana (1998-2002). Indeed, during this period the military’s recalcitrant posi-
tion was reinforced by two important changes in the war system environment,
both heavily influenced by Washington: Plan Colombia and the War on
Terrorism. From the start, the Pastrana government’s peace efforts confronted
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serious resistance from the military, particularly after Pastrana’s controversial
proposal to withdraw the state’s armed forces from five municipalities, which he
had conceded to the FARC in return for its agreement to enter into peace talks.
The military responded by refusing to leave its military base in Cazadores
(Caqueta), one of the five municipalities designated for withdrawal. After politi-
cal wrangling that lasted more than five weeks, the military reluctantly withdrew,
making public their dissatisfaction with the outcome.
The military’s opposition to the peace process was also manifested by their
continual disagreements with Pastrana’s chief negotiator and close aide, Victor G.
Ricardo.  The generals were particularly incensed by the manner in which the
process was being managed by civilian authorities, that is, with little, if any, con-
sultation with senior officers.  This anger reached a dangerous level when then
Minister of Defense Lloreda was left out of the process, an action that served to
firmly align the minister with the generals against the process.
A direct confrontation between the military and the president came in May
1999, when Victor Ricardo announced that the government was considering
extending the withdrawal from the five municipalities for an indefinite period of
time. Lloreda resigned in protest, believing like the military that the government
had already made too many concessions to the FARC, a view that by then was
also widely accepted in Washington.  Subsequently, Lloreda and his military
backers vehemently opposed the renewal of the demilitarized areas. In due
course, the military’s high command used this occasion to present a show of force
and submitted the collective resignation of 12 generals, 20 colonels, and 50 other
officers.46
This en masse resignation was the largest in the country’s history and illus-
trated the widening breach between the civilian and military authorities. In the
wake of this crisis, Pastrana’s political position was weakened considerably. He
was forced to undertake major concessions in order to reconcile the military,
which undermined his position even more. The most important of these was that
the military would henceforth be consulted on the management of the peace
process and that any renewal of the demilitarized areas would be made condition-
al on the FARC’s compliance with a set of terms determined by the military.47 The
1999 crisis significantly altered the civil-military balance, effectively tying
Pastrana’s hand in the negotiation process. Indeed, in the wake of this crisis gov-
ernment negotiators were instructed not to cede to any more of the FARC
demands.48
One reason the military and their conservative allies were so opposed to
Pastrana’s initiative for a negotiated settlement was its proposed terms. According
to Alfredo Rangel, a leading Colombian security specialist, the 1998-2002 peace
process was the first time that the issue of the military reform was on the negoti-
ating table.49 During the 1990 negotiations with M-19, military reform was not
included, due to the weakened position of that organization and the adamant
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opposition of the military. By May 1999, however, the terms of settlement includ-
ed the FARC’s demand for radical reform of the military, specifically a redefini-
tion of the military’s role in the areas of national security and public order, and
severing its links with right-wing paramilitaries.50 For a military indoctrinated by
Cold War ideologies that remained deeply entrenched within its top ranks, this
prospect was tantamount to a “nightmare scenario.”  The political discourse of the
military describes the guerrillas as “bandoleros,” thieves, “bandidos,” robbers,
and “narcoguerrillas,” and, after 11 September 2001 as “terrorists” and “narcoter-
rorists.” These are expressive symbols that reflect the ideological baggage of the
institution which in turn defined the boundaries upon which its identity was con-
structed and its interests formulated.51 Fearing the loss of their economic and
political privileges, and against the backdrop of their conservative ideology, the
generals were in no mood to acquiesce to an ambiguous peace initiative that
might undermine their interests. This was so despite the fact that between 1996
and 1998 the military had suffered its most serious battlefield defeats at the hands
of the FARC.  Indeed, these defeats and the insecurity they engendered only
redoubled the tenacity of the military’s opposition to the peace process.  The mil-
itary remained convinced that the price of peace requested by the FARC was too
high, and too threatening to the power and privilege of the military institution. In
this fashion, the views and actions of the military institution worked to consoli-
date the inertia of the war system. 
What made the military’s opposition consequential to the fate of the
Pastrana initiative was the backing it gained from Plan Colombia and the chang-
ing mood in Washington.  For the military, Plan Colombia was a blessing that
insulated it from having to consider, let alone accept, the FARC’s demands for
far-reaching military reform. Moreover, the increase in hardware and profession-
alization of its troops that was made possible through Plan Colombia’s massive
infusion of US assistance created an additional, and powerful, incentive for the
sustenance of the war system. 
By mid-1999, then, the military had shifted from a defensive to an offen-
sive posture.  This new offensive posture was reinforced by the newly acquired
fleet of 18 US-made Black Hawk helicopters, which included six UH-60.52
Indeed, between 1998 and 2001, the total number of helicopters in the military’s
arsenal increased from 82 to 172, thanks to US assistance.53 By 2004, Colombia
had 200 helicopters.54 Likewise, American-supplied troop transport aircraft
increased from 126 to 223, while the US also provided three stealth planes with
night vision equipment, as well as reconnaissance planes.55 The re-equipment of
the army was paralleled by an increase in the number of professional or volunteer
soldiers during this same period, from 22,000 to 55,000, that is a 150 percent
increase, and regular soldiers, including high school draftees,  from 46,000 to
73,000.56 A US-trained anti-narcotic force, Battalion No. 1, and the Central Anti-
Narcotic Intelligence Unit were already deployed by the end of the 1999.  After
11 September 2001, the US upgraded its intelligence-sharing with its Colombian
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counterparts under the aegis of the War on Terrorism, by among other things, pro-
viding real-time information about guerrilla movements and troop-concentra-
tions.57
This unprecedented reinforcement of military strength and technical
capacity led to a general reversal of forces on the battlefield.58 By 2003, the num-
ber of military-initiated attacks against the guerrillas exceeded those launched by
the guerrillas. Overall, the number of military confrontations rose to 2,312, an
increase of 73 percent from the 2002 level, most of which were initiated by the
army.59 Alongside these measurable changes in military strategy and performance
was a change in the perceptions and incentive structure of the military leadership.
Prior to the advent of Plan Colombia, the commonly held perception shared by
both the military and guerrillas, as well as by the business elites, political leaders,
and important sectors of academe, was that the Colombian conflict had reached
an impasse approximating Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate.”60 However,
with the inception of the plan at least one party – the military – had undergone a
reassessment. Jorge Enrique Mora, then-commander of the army and later com-
mander of the armed forces, best expressed this change when he stated: 
I would like to clarify two important misperceptions about
Colombia’s conflict. The first is the claim that neither the army nor
the guerrillas are capable of winning this war. This is not true.
Today we have the capabilities to win the war. The second misper-
ception is that, if the peace process ends, a terrible war will ensue
that will destroy the country. This is not true, because we are
already in that war.61
The military’s new perception, its confidence both that the war was
winnable and that government forces were already winning it, makes clear its
preference for a peace reached through the defeat and surrender of the FARC,
rather than through negotiation. The biased intervention in the form of the US-
backed Plan Colombia explains why Pastrana’s negotiations never really had a
chance to take hold and why, too, the conflict began to escalate during the nego-
tiating period.  (See Figure 1)
However, during the last few years, the combined resources of the
Colombian state and its US ally have fallen short in decisively altering the bal-
ance of forces. In that time, too, the FARC has adapted its military tactics to off-
set the government’s air power advantage by re-employing guerrilla warfare tac-
tics, moving in small units, and dispersing its forces into larger areas.  Currently,
the US military aid is about USD$680 million, leaving the Colombian state to
find alternative resources to fund a burgeoning defense bill that is estimated at
more than USD$4 billion per year, approximating 5.3 percent of its GDP.63 To
finance the war, the Uribe government is running a budget deficit of 6 percent of
the country’s GDP, which is well-above the 2.5 percent limit set by the IMF.64
Further, the constituency of taxpayers (only 32,000 individuals bought the so-
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called “peace bonds”) that helped in financing the first part of Uribe’s
“Democractic Security Plan” contributed less than USD$1 billion, again expos-
ing the fiscal limitations of the state to pursue a robust counterinsurgency cam-
paign. Now this same constituency is rebelling against paying any more taxes,
thereby increasing the pressure on Uribe to draw on foreign reserves to finance
his war.65
Given the inefficient structure of the military – which has one of the high-
est ratios of administrative versus operational expenses in the world (8:1 com-
pared to 3:1 in the US military) – more money is unlikely to resolve the fiscal cri-
sis that Plan Colombia has brought about. Nor will more money be sufficient to
tip the strategic balance decisively in the military’s favor. More than 66 percent
of the military budget is spent on salaries and pensions rather than on improve-
ments to the military’s operational capabilities. This latter receives less than 11
percent of the total defense budget.66 And, if the conventional wisdom of the
counterinsurgency doctrine is correct – that a successful counterinsurgency
requires a force strength of 10 soldiers to every insurgent – then the Colombian
military will need to double the current complement of its professional and regu-
lar soldiers.  At an estimated cost of about $465 million per year, such reforms
would cost more than USD$1 billion per year.67 This type of expenditure is def-
initely beyond the fiscal capacity of the state, where only 740,000 citizens in a
nation of 42 million pay income taxes and where only 13 percent of government
revenues are from taxes.68
In sum, whereas Plan Colombia succeeded in reinforcing the incentive
structure of the military, contributing to derailing the negotiation process, it failed
to alter the balance of forces in any significant manner, despite some signal
improvements in the performance of the armed forces. In light of the current
structure of the military and the limited fiscal capacity of the Colombian state, a
military build-up needed to match the insurgency’s challenge will not be possi-
ble. Preoccupied with its own domestic deficit and the spiralling costs of its Iraq
adventure, as well as its commitments to rebuilding Afghanistan, the US is clear-
ly in no position to shoulder more of the burden.69 In all, the repercussions of the
biased intervention by the US in the Colombian conflict validates Richard Betts’
observation that “half-measures” only confuse belligerent actors and generate
false hopes for victory.70 US intervention has not been decisive enough to enable
the Colombian military to defeat the guerrillas. Five years after the introduction
of Plan Colombia there is no victor in sight, nor have the guerrilla forces shown
signs of serious weakening.71 This in turn, validates my argument that the biased
intervention ended up reinforcing the inertia of the war system rather than break-
ing the system in favor of the state. 
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B. The Agribusiness Elite, Paramilitaries, and the War System 
The agribusiness elite is a constellation of social groups that include cattle
ranchers, large landowners, and owners of enterprises investing in export orient-
ed cash-crops, such as coffee, flowers, African palms, bananas, rice, and sugar.
Combined their share of the GDP is 13 percent.72 One key sub-group within the
agribusiness elite is the narco-bourgeoisie, which has acquired significant politi-
cal and economic weight in the rural economy during the last two decades. The
narco-bourgeoisie, having found investing in rural areas an effective method for
laundering their narco-dollars, have amassed about 4 million hectares, that is to
say about 48 percent of the country’s most fertile lands, with a calculated dollar
value of USD$2.4 billion.73
Although this segment of the dominant classes is socially differentiated,
politically they are united in their strong opposition to a negotiated settlement
with the insurgency.  They are vehemently against insurgent demands for land
redistribution in the economically strategic areas of Bolivar, Antioquia, Cauca,
Sucre, Cesar, Casanare, Cordoba, Santander, North Santander, and Magdalena
Medio, demands that threaten their key economic interests. To avert such a pos-
sibility, significant sectors of the agribusiness elite in these departments have
helped in creating paramilitary forces to accomplish two main objectives: in the
short-term, to defend themselves from guerrilla-demanded war taxation; and, in
the longer-term, to form a political counterweight to prevent any land reform in
their areas of investment.  The paramilitaries’ determination to drive out the guer-
rillas and their support base from these areas has led to an escalation of the con-
flict, resulting in numerous massacres and the forced displacement of more than
two million people since the 1980s.74 In part, the paramilitaries’ counterinsur-
gency strategy has achieved its goals in a number of areas, such as Cordoba,
Uraba, parts of Bolivar, Cesar, and Magdalena Medio, and has yielded mixed
results in Casanare, Putumayo, Arauca, and North Santander. These successes
have enhanced the political power and military reach of the paramilitaries as well
as their financial sponsors, making them important players in the political econ-
omy of war and peace in Colombia.  By 1999, they had become a force with
enough power to spoil the then on-going peace process.  In 1997, the paramili-
taries founded a national umbrella organization to coordinate their counterinsur-
gency strategy. This umbrella organization, the AUC, was led by the ACCU
(Autodefensas Campesinas de Cordoba y Uraba) of Carlos Castano and 
Salvatore Mancuso, and remained functional until the electoral defeat of Pastrana
by Alvaro Ulribe Velez and the end of the Pastrana-led peace process in 2002.75
Organizing nationally allowed the AUC to project their political power more
effectively, reaching a level of political influence unprecedented in the history of
the conflict. In a span of three years (1997-2000), the AUC augmented its mili-
tary capacity from less than 3,000 fighters to more than 8,000 fighters.76 Such a
significant leap altered the correlation of forces between the insurgency and its
opponents. It also changed the dynamics of the war system and its structure.
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Notably, the war system was reshaped from a bipolar conflict between the guer-
rillas and the state to a multipolar conflict among the guerrillas, the state, and
non-state paramilitaries.   During the same period, the paramilitaries reaped sig-
nificant economic resources from narco-trafficking and protection rents, allowing
them to finance their war machine. Their annual income ranged between
USD$600 million and USD$1billion.77
The powerful growth of the most conservative elements of the agribusiness
elite and their paramilitaries coincided with the beginning of the peace process in
1999, adding yet another obstacle to those discussed above.  Although the
agribusiness elite is not the most endowed in terms of wealth, and hence, in terms
of their position in the economic structure, they feared that they would end up
paying an inordinate cost from a peaceful settlement with the insurgency, espe-
cially if it were to entail significant land redistribution, as was considered in the
Pastrana-led process. Jorge Visbal, president of the Federation of Cattle Ranchers
(FEDEGAN), articulated the core concern of the rural elite regarding a negotiat-
ed settlement with the guerrillas, when he argued that: 
If Colombia has a maldistribution of income, it is not in the rural
sector. If twenty economic groups are owners of the 70% of the
industrial activity, and one banker owns 42% of the financial sector,
then we should not deceive ourselves, where is our (cattle ranchers)
wealth!78
This statement reveals two main issues that are pertinent to this analysis.
One is the schism between the agribusiness elite and the economic conglomerates
(cacaos), which has been aggravated by disagreements over who will bear the
greater costs of a negotiated peace. The agribusiness elite has argued that the
cacaos should pay a share of the costs of social and economic reforms that match-
es their economic might.79 Second, the increasing concentration of land held by
cattle ranchers, large landholders, and narco-bourgeoisie, enabled by the growth
of opportunities brought about by the protection provided by the paramilitaries,
has created a relatively new dimension of the war system, and another impedi-
ment to economic development and peace.80 Given this development, it has
become more difficult than ever to conceive of a viable peaceful solution that
does not include provisions for equitable land distribution to landless and poor
peasants within an overall sustainable developmental strategy. 
In 1999, the agribusiness elite, alarmed by the prospect of a negotiated set-
tlement between the Pastrana government and the guerrillas, decided to resist.
They were able to do so because of their alliance with the increasingly powerful
paramilitaries and also due to the lack of a clear negotiating strategy by the
Pastrana government. The agribusiness elite preferred the continuation of the war
system rather than risk losing parts of their landownership to a settlement reached
under a balance of power that would not decisively protect its interest.81 In vari-
ous iterations, this reasoning explains why the agribusiness elite has been dodg-
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ing a political solution to the agrarian problem for over eight decades.82 But it is
also a position that has cemented the inertia of the current war system, and
explains why the continuance of war is, for this economic sector, still the least
costly and most promising route to terminating the conflict. 
As with the state military, the inception of Plan Colombia injected new
hopes among members of this group for another chance to defeat the insurgency,
thereby avoiding any meaningful land and political reforms that could open new
possibilities for the landless peasants and small land-owners, whose exclusion
from the nation’s wealth has been a continuing reason for the insurgency.83 The
large infusion of US aid was also attractive to large landowners, who resist the
imposition of higher taxes on their properties to support the war.84
The current president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe Velez, is closely linked
with the agribusiness elite in terms of his class origins, ideological orientation,
and political views. Uribe proved very adept at capitalizing on the weaknesses of
Pastrana’s ill-conceived peace process. Uribe sailed successfully to the helm of
political power with the help of the winds that started blowing from Washington
in early 1999. During the peace process (1998-2002), he positioned himself as the
champion of the opposition camp that included the most conservatives elements
of the dominant classes and successfully built a significant support base within
the middle class, which was disenchanted with the slow pace of the peace process
and pinched by the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression of the
1930s. The emergence of the Uribe factor made it more difficult for Pastrana to
garner critical political support from the agribusiness elite and, increasingly, from
among other sectors that had initially supported his initiative for a negotiated
peace settlement.85
C.  The FARC and its Role in the Process of Peace
In 1998, FARC’s willingness to engage in peace negotiations was motivat-
ed by a number of factors. One was its desire to obtain political space that would
allow it to strengthen its political credentials at the national, regional, and inter-
national levels.  This objective was within the FARC’s strategy of accumulating
power that would enable it to prevail in its struggle, as well as achieve its long
sought goal: the status and legitimacy of a recognized belligerent.
In retrospect, the peace talks did provide the FARC with an opportunity to
expose its political views to a wider sector of the Colombian society, as well as
to the international community, bringing it closer than ever before to reaching the
status of recognized belligerent. In February 2000, a joint FARC and government
delegation toured various European countries, including Italy, Spain, Norway,
Sweden, France, and Switzerland. During this trip, the stream of ambassadors and
other foreign dignitaries, including the president of the New York Stock
Exchange, that met with the FARC negotiating team in the demilitarized zone
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attests to the recognition this group won during the peace process.  Nonetheless,
the central question lingers as to whether, in taking these steps, the FARC was
genuinely interested in reaching a negotiated accord. 
It is necessary to keep in mind that in 1998 the FARC was at the zenith of
its military power as it had proved on the battlefield. At the time the FARC was
pursuing a maximalist agenda, a 10-point program that included radical reforms
to the military institution, extensive land distribution for the benefit of poor and
landless peasants, a renegotiation of contracts with multinational companies, an
increase in social spending to a 50 percent of the total public expenditure, and
reform of the neo-liberal economic model of development.86 However, any nego-
tiation of these points was preconditioned by the FARC’s non-negotiable demand
for an exchange of prisoners and a firm state commitment to fight the right-wing
paramilitary groups. These tough demands could be interpreted to mean that the
FARC leadership was not yet ready to compromise for the sake of peace.
Given that the government at that time did not yet have a mandate from the
dominant classes to negotiate the 10 points requested by the FARC, nor even the
12 points that the FARC and government negotiators agreed to negotiate in
Machaca 1999 (Agenda Comun Por el Cambio Hacia Una Nueva Colombia), the
initial talks remained stalled in procedural disputes about the direction of further
negotiations.87 In some respects, this delay was convenient to the Pastrana gov-
ernment, which was not in a position either to overcome the stiffening congres-
sional opposition to the FARC’s demands, particularly concerning prisoner
exchanges, or to assume a more aggressive policy against the paramilitary groups
in the face of the reticent stance of the military.  
Within the Pastrana team, the dominant perception was that a stalled nego-
tiation was better that none, because it lowered the intensity of the conflict, and
gave the government time to restructure its armed forces, rearm, and prepare in
case the negotiations failed.88 Conveniently, the costs of such military restructur-
ing were underwritten by Plan Colombia.89 Indeed, as it happened, the FARC did
reduce its armed attacks during the negotiation period.  (See Figure 2)  But the
military expenditure simultaneously increased from a 4.5 percent of the GDP in
1999 to 5.2 by 2002.90 The stalemated negotiations also yielded some benefits to
the FARC. Alongside the gains mentioned above, the FARC used the demilita-
rized zone to recruit, train, and regroup its troops and to launch attacks against
government forces positioned on the borders of the demilitarized zone. 
However, the political benefits derived by the government from these stale-
mated peace talks were short-lived . The FARC’s continuing military actions –
which included the high-jacking of an aircraft, the assassination of a Liberal Party
leader, Diego Turbay, and his mother, and finally its apparent role in the killing
of a prominent figure of Valludupar, the Minister of Culture Consuelo Araujo
Noguera “Cacica” – alarmed hardliners and intensified their criticism of
Pastrana’s peace plan. In addition, the FARC was behind the killing of three US
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citizens working with the indigenous communities of Arauca.  Taken together
these acts put Pastrana’s team on the defensive and provided ammunition to one
of his main opponents, Alvaro Uribe Velez. 
The introduction of Plan Colombia was received by the FARC as a clear
sign of renewed warfare. One of its military commanders, Jorge Briceno, said of
Plan Colombia: “we are going to war and its results are uncertain, either we win
it or end up negotiating in a remote village in Germany,” suggesting that if FARC
were defeated, then they might be forced to negotiate their surrender in
Germany.91 Briceno’s view of the options as two extremes – either decisive vic-
tory or decisive defeat – is suggestive of what Zartman calls a “fluctuating stale-
mate,” a dynamic process that has characterized the war system since the intro-
duction of Plan Colombia. The key aspect of this new phase is that while the mil-
itary is on the offensive in some areas the guerrillas are exploring the weakness-
es and limitations in another, which could allow the FARC to retake the initiative.
In fact, the FARC had put the military on the defensive during last few months of
2005.  Cases in point are the attacks that the FARC staged in Puerto Inirida,
Uraba, Dabeiba (Antioquia), Narino, Choco, and Teteye, among others.   
Even while continuing to participate in the peace talks the FARC began to
prepare for the new phase of war that it anticipated would follow US intervention.
This necessitated securing additional sources of funding to counter balance the
influx of US aid to the military. In April 2000, three months prior to the US.
Congressional approval of Plan Colombia and after President Clinton’s visit to
Colombia in which he promoted Plan Colombia, the FARC issued its 002 Law.
This law instructed individuals with assets of USD$1million and more to pay a
“peace tax” to the FARC under penalty of detention.
At the operational level, FARC also changed its military tactics, abandon-
ing its policy of “mobile war” and returning to guerrilla war tactics. In addition,
after 2000, the FARC reduced its military operations at the national level and in
its stronghold of Meta and Caqueta. (See Figure 2) These steps were undertaken
to consolidate its forces after it suffered several important military reversals that
started in 1999 and increased between 2000 and 2001. These reverses were main-
ly due to the military’s increasing air power, particularly its newly acquired US
helicopters. 
However, between 2002 and 2004, the FARC not only managed to stem
these battlefield reversals but also to retake the military initiative. This is demon-
strated by the rising trend of FARC-initiated attacks that increased from 227 per
year between 1998 and 2002 to 450 per year in the 2002-04 period.  By contrast,
the number of military-initiated attacks decreased from 2,414 in 2003 to 1,975 in
2004.92 These figures indicate the onset of a condition of “fluctuating stalemate”
and an end to the comfortable impasse of the Colombian war system.93
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Figure 2. FARC Military Activity 1990-2002 
Source: Vicepresidencia de la Republica, Informes 2004.
Overall, Plan Colombia introduced significant changes to the incentive
structures of the conflict’s key actors that, in hindsight, proved detrimental to the
already vulnerable peace process.  The plan also profoundly changed the politi-
cal economy of the war system: by providing assets for the government’s cam-
paign against the FARC, the plan triggered a new cycle of financial and military
countermeasures by the FARC that together contributed to the maintenance and
inertia of the war system. 
CONCLUSION 
As this analysis has sought to explain, neither Pastrana nor the FARC ini-
tiated the peace process, nor were they motivated by a desire to achieve a viable
peace. Rather, they were both enticed by the prospect of immediate political gains
made possible by the intervention of UN mediators. Quite plausibly, this neutral
intervention reduced the then escalating trend in the war system’s dynamics, but
this abatement lasted only a few months.  Indeed, it remained limited to the initi-
ation of the process due to the opposition of both the government and the insur-
gency.  By the time the two parties accepted the facilitation of the UN special
envoy in January 2002, the process already faced imminent collapse and was
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beyond saving.94 In this respect, it is worth noting President Pastrana’s critical
evaluation of the role of the UN special envoy, James Lemoyne, who was “con-
fused between his role of facilitator and mediator, which created more damage
than good in salvaging the process.”95 This point of not confusing the roles of
facilitator and mediator may be a good lesson to learn and avoid in any future
peace processes.     
In 1999, the seeds of another type of intervention, this one biased by US
national interest, were planted that would eventually lead to an escalation in the
scope and intensity of conflict that was unprecedented since 1990, and that con-
tinued its upward swing well into 2004.  This escalation was primarily due to the
impact of the military aid and assistance administered by the US to the
Colombian military. 
That this cycle of renewed violence began with the military is demonstrat-
ed by the fact that from 2001 until 2003, most attacks were initiated by the mili-
tary; during this period, the FARC assumed a largely defensive posture.  The abil-
ity of the military to undermine Pastrana’s peace efforts was strengthened not
only by US support but by the powerful domestic alliance of the agribusiness
elite, narcobourgeoisie, and their paramilitaries.
Neither type of third-party intervention led to the termination of the con-
flict, a fact that appears to support the thesis that third-party interventions are sel-
dom conducive to peace, as argued by Regan, Betts, and Carment and Rowlands.
But, this analysis also validates the thesis of Balch-Lindsay and Enterline that
neutral interventions reduce the inertia of the war system by helping to deceler-
ate the rate of violence, while biased interventions accelerate inertia, bringing the
war system to a new point of violent equilibrium.  As became evident in 2004,
biased intervention affected the inertia of the war system but not enough to induce
a change that could lead to its collapse.  A case in point was the decrease in the
number of combats. The number of military initiated attacks declined by 18 per-
cent from their 2003 level while the number of attacks initiated by the guerrillas
decreased by 19 percent, which means the inertia is helping the war system to
secure its new state of motion.96
The contemporary war system in Colombia has entered Zartman’s phase
of “fluctuating stalemate” – that is to say, it has moved away from a comfortable
impasse to a stage where the military is on the offensive and the guerrillas on the
defensive, dodging down, spreading its forces, avoiding large concentrations of
troops, or major battles that could make their forces vulnerable to the military’s
new air power advantage.  However, it is a only a question of time before the
guerrillas reinforce their anti-aircraft defenses – as the Frente Farabundo Marti
para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) did when they acquired Sam-7 missiles
during the last phase of the Salvador’s civil war, thereby re-establishing an equi-
librium in the war system.
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